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[L. A. No. 18121. In Bank. Dec. 5, 1944.]

UNIVERSAL CONSOLIDATED OIL COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent, v. H. L. BYR.A.M, as County
Tax Collector, etc., Appellant.
[L. A. No. 18122. In Bank. Dec. 5, 1944.]

LONG BEACH HARBOR OIL COMPANY (a Corporation),
Respondent, v. H. L. BYRAM, as County Tax Collector,
etc., Appellant.
/)

[la, Ib] Taxation - Equaliz&tion - Proceedinp of Local Boards- .
PresumptioDB.-In actions to enjoin collection of taxes and for
revaluation of oil lease!! for taxation purposes, evidence that
one member of the county board of equalization did not participate at the final meeting, that two other members expressed
the mistaken view that plaintifts' application for reduction of
the valuations raised legal rather than factual issues, and that
the two remaining members failed to deny incorrect statements
made incident to an adverse ruling on the applications, overcame the presumption that the board performed its ofllcial
duty to equalize the valuation of taxable property in the county.
[2] ld.-Equalization-Proceedings of Local Boards-DecisionMajority of Board.-In a proceeding before a board of equalization for reduction of the valuations placed on certain oil
leases, a determination by two rather than by three qualified
members of the board did not satisfy the statutory requirement that at least a majority of tbe board must act on tbe
evidence presented.
[8] ld.-Equalization-Proceedings of Local Boards-Decision.In a proceeding before a board of equalization for reduction of
the valuations placed on certain oil leases, the taxPayers' constitutional right to a hearing comprehended a decision in the
light of the evidence there introduced before any determination
became flnal as to them.
[4] Id.-EClualization-ProceedJDgs of Local Boards-Nature of
Proceedinl8.-The equalization stage of a tax proceeding is no
in
exception to tbe rule that a tax· proceeding is ..

,,",if,,,,,

[3] See 24 Oa1.Jur. 242.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Taxation, § 207; [2, 3] Taxation,
§ 203; [4) Taxation, § 195: [5] Taxation, § 200; [8] Taxaticm,
,205; [7J Taxation, § 208; [8] Taxation, 1196.
II c.M-U
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DAture and .hat each step must be taken in compliance with
law or the proceeding is void.
[5] Id.-Equalization-Proceedings of Loca.1 Boards-Rearing.Compliance with theconstitutionaJ requirement for an equalization hearing is not met unless the substance as well as the
form of the hearing is granted to the complaining taxpayer.
[6] Id.-Equalization-Proeeedings of Local Boards-Oonclusiveness of Action.-A county board of equalization is the factfinding body designated by law to remedy excessive assessments, and when that tribunal, after due hearing and within
the limits of reasonable discretion, makes its findings on the
facts, such decision is final and conclusive.
. [7a, 7b] Id.-Equalization-Proceedings of Local Boards-Beview.
-In actions to enjoin the collection of taxes and for revaluation of oil leases for taxation purposes, while the absence of
an adjudication by the county board of equalization as to the
facts in issue and a failure to consider the evidence or the
merits of the objections raised amounted to a lack of procedural due process, authorizing the court to nullify the board's
'ruling, the intent of the law governing equalization proceedings required that the cases be remanded to the board for
completion on the basis of the evidence submitted at the hearing before it. (Bandini Estate 00. v. Los Aftgeus OOtlMfy, 28
C.A.2d 224, 82 P.2d 185, disapproved in part.)
(8] Id.-Equalization-Proceedings of Local Boards-Meetiqs of
Board-Time for.-While the right of a board of equalization
is limited by Rev. & Tax. Code, § 1603, that provision is directory only and d()es not deflect from the statutory scheme
that the authorized tribunal passon matters properly within
its jurisdiction, though in the completion of its work it must
act at a time beyond the prescribed period.

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Caryl M. Sheldon, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Actions to enjoin collection of taxes and for revaluation of
oil leases for taxation purposes. Judgments for plaintiffs
reversed with directions.
J.B. O'Connor, County Counsel, S. V. O. Prieh&rd, A&sistant County Counsel, and A. Curtis Smith and Gordon
Boller, Deputies County Counsel, for Appellant.
Faries & McDowell, Holbl'OQk & Tarr, C. E. McDowell
aDd W. Sumner Bolbrook, Jr., for Bespondenta.
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CURTIS, J ....-Universal Consolidated on Company and
Long Beach Harbor Oil Company duly filed with the Board
of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles, sitting as the
board of equalization for said county, applications for reduction of the valuations placed by the assessor for the year
1940-1941 upon certain of their oil leases in the Long Beach
Harbor-Wilmington Field. The applications were denied by
the board, and the oil companies thereupon commenced these
actions to enjoin collection of the taxes and to bave the court
revalue the leasehold interests for assesment purposes. As
the premise of their respective claims to relief. the plaintiffs
charged that the particular method of assessment used in relation to their leases 'produced valuations which were unfair,
unjust and excessive as compared with other property holdings of substantially the same character and value and similarly situated in the county. and 80 imposed an unequal
burden upon the complainants; that the clear purport of the
testimony presented at the hearing before the board established these matters as proper eases for equalization, but that
the board, in its summary denial of the applications for reduction, intentionally failed and refused to consider the evidence before it and. in disregard thereof, expressly. deliberately, and wilfully withheld decision of the questions of fact
in issue; and that their constitutional rights to due process
and equal protection of the laws have thereby been invaded.'
In their individual complaint.A the plaintiff!'! also recited their
tender to the tax collector. and hil'! rejection. of certain
amounts which they estimated as properly representative of
the taxes due for the year in question under a fail' valuation
of their leases. and such sums. together with the respective
balances purportedly owing upon the basiR of the &8I'IesRed
values, were deposited in cOurt as a condition to the issuance
of temporary injunctions in restraint of the collection of the
challenged taxeS pending the final determination of these
matters. (County of LoR Att.geZu v.Ballentt.O. 99 Cal. 593.
597 [32 P. 581, 34 P. 3291: County of Los Att.geles v. Ramohoff, 24 Cal.App.2d 238. 245 f74 P.2<1 8281.) The-defendant
tax collector in hi!'!' respective answel'R denied the material
charges of the complainti'! as to the mega.1itv of the method
of computing the taxes in qUeRtion and the failure of the board
to determine the points in controversy upon the merits.
The actions were ("onsolMated for tria.], lind toere was introduced in evidence the applications for reduced valuations as
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mentioned, the reporter'. transeript of the testimony at the
hearing before the board, and certain exhibits there presented.
In addition, further evidence was introduced, over the objection of the defendant, as to the ~r'. method of assessment of the leases in question and' as to the relative value of
the plaintiifs' and adjacent leasehOld interests. It was stipulated at the trial that it was the general method of assessment
in Los .Angeles County in 1940 to assees leasehold interests
as here involved "at not to exceed 50 Pel" cent of their market
value." Counsel for the parties &lao agreed by stipulation as
to the then prevailing tax rate for such property holdinp.
After a full hearing in these eases, the trial court found in
favor of the plaintiJfs on all material issues In dispute and
made considerable reductions In the ehallenged valuations.
The taxes on the leasehold interests were then computed at
the stipulated rate, and the clerk of the court, from the moneys
previously deposited with him by the plaintiffs, was directed
to pay the amounts 10 ealculated as a full discharge of the
disputed tax claims and to refund to the plaintiffs the respective segregable balances remaining. From the separate
judgments 80 entered in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendant
has appealed. .As heretofore consolidated, the cast8 are presented on appeal upon one record and involve identical
questions.
. The principal point in controversy between the parties concerns the propriety of the plaintiifs' recourse to the court· for
relief from the adverse determination of the county bc.rd
of equalization. It must be conceded, of eourse, that it is
well settled in this state that to the authorized county board
of equalization has been confided the duty of determining
"the value of the property under consideration for assessment purposes upon such basis as is used in regard to other
property, sO as to make all the assessments as equal and fair
as is practicable"; that in discharging this duty, "the board
is exercising judicial functions, and its decision as to the
value of the property and the fairness of the _SuBlent so .
far as amount is concerned constitutes an independent and
conclusive judgment of the tribunal ereated by law for the
determination of that question," adjudicating necessarily
that "the property is assessed at the same value proportionately as all the other property in the county"; that such
adjudication "cannot be avoided unless the board has pro-
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ceeded arbitrarily and in willful disregard of the law intended
for their guidance and control, with the evident purpose of
imposing unequal burdens upon certain of the taxpayers'
• • . or unles there be something equivalent to fraud in the
action of the board"; and that "Mere errors in honest judgment as to the value of the property will not obviate the binding effect of the conclusion of the board." (Los AngeZes etc.
CO. V. County of Los Angeles, 162 Cal. 164, 169-170 [121 P.
384, 9 A.L.R. 1277]; see, also, Southern Pac. Land CO. V. San
Diego County, 183 Cal. 543, 546 [191 P. 931]; Birch v. County
of Orange, 1860a1. 736, 741 [200 P. 647]; Wild Goose Country Club v. County of Butte, 60 Cal.App. 339, 342 [212 P.
711]; Merchants Trust CO. V. HopkifU, 103 Cal.App. 473,
477-478 [284 P. 1072]; Montgomery Ward ct Co. v. Welch, 17
Ca1.App.2d 127, 132 [61 P.2d 790]; Southern Cal. Tel. CO. V.
Los Angeles County, 45 Cal.App.2d 111, 116-117 [113 P.2d
773].) While not classifiable with any aspect of fraud or bad
faith, the lack of due process distinguishing the procedural
phase of these equalization matters as submitted to the board
furnishes an equally appropriate basis for the court's intervention in protection of the plainti1fs' constitutional rights.
From the transcript of the proceedings before the board,
which was in evidence at the trial, it appears that on July 18,
1940, testimony in these eases was presented before three
members: Supervisors Jessup, Hauge and McDonough; that
at the termination of the oral hearing the matters were taken
under advisement; and that a final ruling on the applications
was made on August 1, 1940, at a formal meeting of the board,
when, in addition to the above-named members, Supervisors
Ford and Smith were also present, neither of whom had attended the previous hearing nor heard the testimony. Two
other applications were before the board at the same time for
disposition; namely, those of Signal Oil & Gas Company, No.
268, and Long Beach Oil Development Company, No. 269.
At this final meeting, when neither the complainants nor their
counsel were present, the following colloquy incident to the
denial of the applications in question took place:
"Chairman Jessup: Signal Oil & Gas Company, No. 268,
and Long Beach Oil Development Company, No. 269. Mr.
McDonough: This is a possessory interest! Mr. Ford: I was
not in on this. Mr. Smith: 1-2 and 5. Mr. McDonough: This
ja iD. the same situation as Signal.. Mr. Smith; Y•. <Mr. Me-
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Donough: They are both alike. Mr. Smith: Signal Oil & Gas
Company and the Universal Oil Company and Long Beach
Oil Company. Mr. McDonough: There is a legal question involved here. Mr. Smith: I think they appeared only to protect
their rights in court and made very little showing and I think
we should deny it. Mr. McDonough: Well, I still think we
should have an opinion of the County Counsel attached to
the application for the advice of the Board and also in the
event it is pursued in court. Mr. Smith: It is in court right
now. Mr. McDonough: Let's set it aside for a moment. Mr.
Smith: I made a statement during the hearing. • . •
"Chairman Jessup: Now, on the Signal Oil & Gas Company, No. 268. Long Beach Oil Development Company, No.
269, Universal Oil Company, No. 1020, and Long Beach
Harbor Oil Company, No. 1021. Mr. McDonough: Mr. Boller
[Deputy County Counsel] is here. Mr. Boller: Yes. Mr.
McDonough: Now, these oil applications that we heard, they
indicated that the application!l show a contractor's lease with
the land owners for the purpose of drilling of wells. Mr.
Boller : Yes, on Signal Oil & Gas and Long Beach Oil Development Company. Mr. Smith: Universal and Long Beach
Harbor Oil Company were similar. Mr. Boller: I think the
two were the only ones Mr. Holmes handled. Mr. McDonough:
Holmes appeared for-- Mr. Boller: For Signal Oil & Gas
Company and the Long Beach Oil Development Company. Mr.
Smith: Didn't you make a statement at the time of the hearing that they were here appearing in regard to protecting
their rights' Mr. Boller: That was as to the Signal Oil & Gas
and the Long Beach Oil Development Company only. Mr.
Smith: The other two would be the same. Mr. Boller: There
is no question but what that is so on the two cases Mr. Holmes
presented. Mr. Smith: I move that the Long Beach Oil Development Company-- Mr. McDonough: Wait a minute,
I want to ask Mr. Boller would it help the case any if it was
referred to the County Counsel. Mr. Boller: No. Mr. Smith:
Move that it be denied. Mr. Boller: On the Long Beach Oil
Development Company the application was for cancellation
and was heard in the same hearing and is to be acted upon by
the Board of Supervisors. Mr. McDonough: That is another
application on a case coming to us. Mr. Boller: You have answered on that. Mr. Smith: I move that the Si!!nn] Oil & Gas
Company be denied. Chairman Jessup; So ordered. Mr.

)
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Smith: I move that the Long Beach Harbor· Oil Company be
denied and Universal Oil Company No. 1020 be denied. Chairman Jessup: So ordered. Mr. Smith: That these four be denied. Chairman Jessup: So ordered. Mr. McDonough: On
these matters it is a legal question to be determined by the
Court rather than a matter of equalization. Mr. Boller: It is
essentially so in the Signal Oil & Gas Company and the Long
Beach Oil Development Company cases. It seems to me the
others were factual in their showing. Mr. Smith: It is the
same thing, they have a lease and are being assessed on their
interests. They have a contract and are being assessed as
though it were a lease. They are protecting their interest and
in case the Long Beach Oil Development Company and the
other one should win in court, these people are in the same
position. Mr. Boller: Their agreement is not as carefully
drawn up with· the thought of not being taxable as a lease.
Mr. Smith: Yes, the resume they attach is exactly the same.
Mr. Boller: I didn't look at them. Mr. McDonough: The basis
is the determination of a Zegalquestion rather than an appeal
on a question of equalization. Mr. Boller: It is 80 as to Signal
and the Long Beach Oil Development Company." (Italics
added.)
[la] From this quoted portion of the record of the board
proceedings, it is clear that two members (McDonough and
Smith), one of whom had neither heard nor been advised as
to the evidence adduced with regard to the two matters here
in question, expressed their distinct understanding that they
were passing upon four applications which presented wholly
a point of law to be settled by the court rather than matters
of equalization. Despite the advice of the deputy county
counsel herein concerned that the plaintiffs' applications
raised factual issues before the board, the said mcmbers adhered to the belief that all four oil companies were urging
like objections to the assessed valuations of their respective
properties and that if the complainants Signal Oil & Gas Company and Long Beach Oil Development Company should prevail in court upon the legal proposition which they advanced
in their equalization hearing, the plaintiffs also would be
sustained upon the same premise, which apparently rested on
the claim that the particular form of contract employed would
render them entirely exempt from taxation on their holdings.
No such argument had ever been made by the plaintiffs;
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rather, they had conceded from the outset that their leasehold
interests were taxable, query simply having been raised 88 to
the legality of the method of assessment followed in their cases.
The' plaintiffs had not been notified that their applications
were to be considered at this final meeting, their counsel ac.·
cordingly were not present, and they had no opportunity to
clarify the evident confusion in the minds of the board members as to the issues involved. While three of the 'board
members, 88 above noted, had heard extentive testimony 88
to valuation bases with respect to the plaintiffs' leases, apparently at the subsequent formal meeting of the board they
did not correlate. this prior hearing of factual evidence with
the plaintiffs' applications. Thus, at the final meeting Supervisor Ford did not participate; Supervisors Smith and McDonough expressed their mistaken views 88 above recited;
and Supervisors Jessup and Hauge, in failing to deny any
of the incorrect statements made incident to the adverse ruling upon the plaintiffs' applications, manifestly acquiesced
therein upon the same erroneous premise. Such affirmative
showing in 'the record that the board acted without regard
for the evidence before it overcomes the presumption that it
performed its official duty "~ equalize the valuation of tuable property in the county." (HumboldfCounty v. Dinsmore, 75 Cal. 604, 607-608 [17 P. 710]; Hagenmeyer v. Board
of Eq'lUilizafion, 82 Cal. 214, 218 [23 P. 14]; Rancho Santa
Marnarita v. San Diego County, 185 Cal.App. 134, 143 [26
P.2d 716].) [a] But even if it were reasonable to assume
that the silence of Supervisors Jessup and Hauge at the final
meeting on these matters did not demonstrate their acquiescence in the confused views of their associates but that, on
the contrary, they, as tbe result of attendance at the iirst
hearing, had the character of the plaintiffs' applications
iinnly .in mind when they joined in the adverse decision·
thereon, still such determination by two rather than three
qualified members (McDonough, Jessup and Hauge) of the
tribunal authorized to equalize assessments would not satisfy
the statutory requirement that atleast a maiority of the board
must act upon the evidence presented. (Ban.dini Estate Co.
v. Los Angeles Count!l, 28 Cal.App.2d 224, 229-230[82 P.2d
185].)
[3] The fnnonmrn1rt pr<>mise of the plnilltiff's recourse
to the court for relief rests upon the proposition that, as with

)
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any ad valorem tax, their constitutional right to an equalization hearing comprehends a decision i,.. 1M Zigh.1 of 1M ."'dencB there introduced before any determination becomes
final as to them. (Bandini Estat. Co. v. Lo, AngeZu County,
supra, at p. 230; Lon.doner v. Dent1.r, 210 U.S. 373, 386 [28
S.Ot. 708, 52 L.Ed. 1103].) [4] As any tax proceeding is
in invitum in nature, each step must be taken in compliance
with law or the proceeding is void. The equalization stage is
no exception to this rule. [5] Compliance with theconstitutional requirement for an equalization hearing is not met
unless the substance as well as the form of the hearing is
granted to the cOmplaining taxpayer. (Bondini Estat. Co.
v. Los Angeles Oounty, supra, at p. 227.) Typiea1 illustrations
of the denial of procedural due process which have been held
to invalidate purported equalization detenninations are: One
man hearings (Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angele. County.
supra, at pp. 228-230): the taking of evidence without the
presence of the taxpayer or his representative (Car"'" v.
Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 572. 577 [158 P. 2181; BGftdini lCstat. 00.
·v. Los Angel.s Oounty, supra, at p. 231); the refusal to allow
reasonable opportunity for cross-examination (Int.rstate Oommerc. Com.v. Louisvt1le tt Nash.. R.R., 227 U.S. 88. 93 f33
S.Ot. 185. 57 L.Ed. 4311): the refusal to permit reasonable
argument (Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 37S. 386 [28 S.Ot.
708, 52 L.Ed. 1103]); reliance in the concluding steps upon
the advice of the assessor 01' the assessor's attorney, particularly if done secretly (Morgan v. United Stat". 304 U.S. 1,
19-20 [58 S.Ct. 773. 82 L.Ed. 1129]) : and the attempted determination of a case by members of the board who did not
hear the evidence. if their vote be necessary to the determination (Hawkins v. Gd. Rapids Common Council. 192 Mich.
276. 291-292 rt58 N.W. 953. \Ann.Cas.1917E 700]).
[ib] In line with these instances of the denial of procedural due proCesR are the present eases. The c:oncZuding "ep.
of the equalization proceeding are Jnany times the most essential to tht' preservlttion of the taxpayer'R rights. Thus. in
Morgan v. TTnited States. supra, it IS pertinently said in this
regard (304 U.S. 20): "The requirements of fairness are
not exhausted in the taking or consideration of evidence but
extend to the concluding parts of the procedure as well 18 to
the beginning ann intermediate .steps." (Italies added.) Adverting to the aho\-e recited conduct of the board at its
final meeting with respect to the plaintiffa' applieatiODS, it is
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plain that there was no adjudication 4$ to tke facts in issue
and no consideration of the evidence or the merits of the objections raised. The deci!:lion of the board was simply that
it had nothing to decide, and it accordingly failed to function
as an equalization tribunal. In the light of its mistaken underRtanding as to the factual background of the applications
before it for appropriate disposition, the consequences of the
boards omission to act upon the evidence presented were just
as disastrous to the plaintiffs' cases as would have been the
board's refusal to take jurisdiction of the proceedings or to
accord the plaintiffs a hearing.
But the mistake of the board in the respect noted does not
sanction the court's undertaking to resolve the conflicting
issues of fact bearing upon the taxable value of the plaintiffs'
leasehold interests. [6] As appears from the numerous authorities cited in the forepart of this opinion, the respective
county board of equalization is the fact-finding body designated by law to remedy excessive asses.~ments (Cal. Const.,
art. XIII, § 9). and when that tribunal, after due hearing
and within the limits of reasonable discretion, makes its findings on the facts, such decision is final and conclu.sive. The
present cases involve a dispute as to the proper method of
asses..sment of plaintiff!!' property interests, there was a confiiet in the evidence on that iR.~ue as presented to the board,
and that tribunal should decide the merits or demerits of the
complaint before it. It is essential to the performance of
governmental functions that an orderly system of assessment
and collection of taxes shall be maintained, and that the
amounts of the assessments be fixed with certainty in a prescribed manner. The prevailing statutory scheme in this state
on equalization matters proyide.'l for a method of reviewin~
the valUeR fixed by the assessor and a tribunal to pass upon
any claims of overvaluation. (Rev. & Tax Code, § 1601 et
seq.). [7a] While conRiderations of procedural due proces.~
here nullify the force of the authorized trihunal's ruling and
sustain its avoidance by the court in response to the plaintiffs'
applications for relief therefrom, the intent of the law governing equalization proceeding!! would require that these ~
be remanded to the board for completion upon the basis of
the evidence submitted at the hearing before it. [8] True,
the life of 11 board of equalization is limited by statute (Rev.
& Tax. Code, § 1603), but that provision is directory only

)
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and does not deflect from the statutory scheme that the authorized tribunal pass upon matters properly within its jurisdiction though in the completion of its work it must act at a
time beyond the prescribed period. (Buswell v. Board of
Supervisors of Alameda County, 116 Cal. 351, 354 [48 P.
226]; Whiting Finance Co. v. Hopkins, 199 Cal. 428, 436 [249
P.853].) [7b] While in the case of Bandini Estate Co. v.
Los Angeles County, supra, upon establishment of the invalidity of the equalization proceeding by reason of defects
in the composition of the board and in the conduct of the
hearing amounting to a lack of procedural due process. "it
[was] ordered that the judgment [against the taxpayer] be
reversed, and the cause remanded to the trial court to ascertain the proper values of the various parcels in question, and
determine the amount of the taxes due thereon" (28 Cal.App.
2d 232]. it does not appear from the opinion, with but such
passing treatment of the point, that the question of the proper
tribunal to which valuation issues for purposes of assessment
should first be submitted was there rai!'!ed or received considered judgment. In so far as the quoted language is contrary
to the views herein expressed, it must be disapproved.
The foregoing discussion renders it unnecessary to consider
other propositions presented on these appeaL; relative to the
conduct of the trial incident to the court's determination of
the meritl-. of plaintiffs' equalization claims.
The .iudgment is reversed with directions to the trial court
to remand these matters to the Los Angeles County Board of
Equalization for further consideration and action in accordance with due process of law. It is also ordered that the money
placed on depo!'!it herein by the plaintiffs as representative of
their tax liability under the assessed valuations of their property interests and as a condition of their application for equitable relief, be retained by the court pending the determination of these equalization matters by t.he board. While on
this point the present cases present a peculiar question of
procedure. "There is nothing particularly unusual or contrary to good practice for the court in the exercise of it!'!
equity powen; to retaIn jurisdiction of the parties and the
subject matter of the action, when thE' circumstanc~ of the
case warrant the !'lame. until the appropriate remedy may be
finally accorded by the jlld~ment in the action" Olurp71'1 v.
Bucke's Depa1'tment Store, 199 Cal. 194, 198 [248 P. 668]),

)
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and upon analogous reasoning a like principle should prevail here to assure justice to all partieR concerned. Accordingly, the final disposition of these cases must await the board's
ruling on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims and the court's
disbursement of the fund on deposit herein in conformity
with the terms thereof.
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Edmonds, J., concurred. Carter, J.,
concurred in the judgment of reversal.
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring and DissentiDg.-I concur in
the first six paragraphs of the majority opinion and in the
conclusion that a taxpayer has no right to a trial de novo
in the superior court to resolve the conflicting issues of fact 88
to the taxable value of his property. In my opinion, however,
the record of the board of equalization proceedings discloses
nothing to indicate that plaintiffs were denied due procesll
of law.
In their complaint to the county board of equalization
plaintiffs contended that the assessments of their propertie.<l
were excessive because the assessor had used a discriminatory
method of determining value. On July 18, 1940. they hail
a hearing before three members of the board of equalization.
Their expert testified that the as.'Ie.~ed value should have
been arrived at by a volumetric method applied on an acrl>age
basis. The assessor's method W8Jo1 based on production \'l\.lue
of existing wells. which was explained by his oil vahllltion
engineer. The board of equalization accepted the lat.ter's
testimony and denied relief to plaintiffs. Constnlctive fraud
cannot be predicated on that acceptance. Los Angeles etc.
Co. v. Countll of Los Angeles. 162 Cal. 164. 169-170 [121 P.
384. 9 A.L.R. 1277]; Birch v. County of Ora.nge. 186 Cal.
736, 741 r200 P. 6471.)
The majority opinion is based. not on what occurred at
the hearing on July 18th. but on what occurred when the
matters came up for deeiRion at the fonnal meeting of the
board of August 1. 1940. Equalization m8ttersin LOR An-.
geleR County are cuRtomarily hearo bv three boaro members.
different groups of three Ritting on different days. Many caseR
are taken undl'r RubmiRRion and called up for decision when
all five members of the board are preRent AO that all Rl1bmitted
matteI'R ready for decillion can be pRMl'd upon at one timt'!.
If a fourth or fifth member should vote upon an application
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that he did not hear, hi!l vote must be disregarded, but that
would not invalidate the proceeding. The transcript of the
board proceedings shows that when the two applications in
these cases were called upfoI' decision, there were two other
applications involving other oil propertie.o: heard by different
board members, one of whom was Supervisor Smith. The
record disclose!: that he made no remark!l designed to influence the three board members who heard the evidence in the
present eases and voted to deny the applications.
There was nothing improper in the attendance at the board
meeting of the deputy county counsel who represented the
assessor. The record discloses that he did nothing to influence
the vote of any member of the board.
There is no~ merit in the contention that the board intentionally withheld any judgment for the purpose of submitting the matter later in court. According to the record Supervisor McDonough was simply not convinced that plaintiff's
property had been improperly asse..'1sed and was of the opinion
that whatever remedy the taxpayer might have muRt be
through the courts. Even if his reasoning was erroneous, and
the decision in which he joined was based on it. the decision
would not violate due proce.'I!l any more than would an erroneous judgment of any court. (Gray v. Hall, 203 Cal. 306. 317
[265 P. 246] j Patterson v. Oolorado, 205 U.S. 454. 461 f27
S.Ct. 556. 51 L.Ed. 879]; _4bbott v. National Bank of Oommerce, 175 U.S. 409. 414 [20 8.Ct. 153, 44 L.Ed. 217]; Jones
v. Buffalo Oreek etc. 00., 245 U.S. 328. 329 f38 S.Ct. 121. 62
L.Ed. 325]; Oentral Land 00. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103. 110.
112 f16 S.Ct. 80, 40 L.Ed. 91] : Worcester Oounty Trust 00.
v. R,aey, 302 U.S. 292, 299 [58 S.Ct. 185. 82 L.Ed. 268].)
The majority opinion declare..'1 that "while three of the
board members, as above noted. had heard extensive testimony
as to ·the valuation bases with respect to plaintiffs' leases. they
did not correlate this prior hearing of factual evidence with
plaintiffs'applieations." There is nothing in the record to
indicate that the three memben; who heard the evidence did
not correlate it with the plaintiff~' applications. Havinp: no
special insight into the mental processes of the board members
this court cannot determine that they failed to correlate plain.
tiffs' applications and the evidence heard in the previous hearing. Indeed, the presumption ill that they did. (Utah Oon"ruction. Co. v. Richarcl8on, 187 Cal. 649, 654 [203 P. 401];

)
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Sauings& Loan Soc. v. San Francisco, ]46 Cal. 673, 678 [80
P. l08G]; J[annon v. Madden, 214 Cal. 251, 267 [5 P.2d 4];
Wild Goose COllntry Club v.County of Butte, 60 Cal.App.
339, 342 [212 P. 711]; Merchants Trust Co. v. Hopkins, 103
Cal.App. 473, 478 [284 P. 1072]; Great Nodhern R. R. Co:
v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135 [56 S.Ct. 426, 80 L.Ed. 532, 5361.}
It must therefore be concluded that the evidence failed to
convince them that the asse~sments were improper. There ill.
no requirement that the board members give written opinions
in the cases before them or set forth orally the mental processes that prompted their conclusions. Indeed, there can be
no inquiry into 'those processes to unpeach their decision.
(Chicago B. & O. Ry. Co. v.Babcock. 204 U.S. 585, 593 [27
S.Ct. 326, 51 L.Ed. 636].) Nor can their written or oral
expression of opinion be used for that purpose. "To hold that
oral or written opinions or expressions of judges of trial courts
may be resorted to to overturn judgments would be to open
the door to mischievous and vexatious practices." (De Cou
v. Howell, 190 Cal. 741, 751 [214 P. 444].)
Moreover, the decision of the board was made by three
members. Only one member's expre.'!Sion of opinion is attacked. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the
lilajority shared his view. The prevailing opinion states that
"Supervisors Jessup and Hauge, in failing to deny any of
the incorrect statements made incident to the adverse ruling
upon the plaintiffs' applications, manifestly acquiesced therein
upon the same erroneous premise." Supervisor McDonough
was speaking for himself, and his statement was no more
binding on the other members of the board than statements
from the bench by one member of this court would be on the
other members, in ruling on motions or during oral arguments.
Each member may have his own reasons for his vote and may
not only disagree with the statements of the others but interpret them differently. Otherwise members of any judicial
body would be constrained to deny aU statements of their
colleagues with which they disagreed, and the consequence
would be interminable hearings.
There is no question in this case that plaintiffs had a fair
hearing before an appropriate tribunal, as required by the
due process clause. None of the charges is sufficient ground to
set aside a judgment of a superior court or any other court.
'!"here is no reason why they should suffice to set aside the
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decision of a quasi judicial body like the local board in this
case. (See Laisne v. California State Board of Optometry,
19 Ca1.2d 831 [123 P.2d 457].)
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